Mass customization depends on a company's ability to provide customized products or services based on economical and flexible development and production systems. Product family design provides a way to achieve cost-effective mass customization by allowing highly differentiated products to be developed from a common platform while targeting products to distinct market segments. In dynamic and uncertain market environments, however, we only have incomplete or uncertain information regarding market trends, customer's preferences, production costs, and the company's strategies for product development. The objective of this paper is to propose a methodology for strategic platform design in a product family using concepts from game theory to model the situations of uncertain market environments. We identify module-based platform design for a product family and consider a module selection problem as a strategic game with incomplete information. In particular, a Bayesian game is employed to model uncertainty situations regarding market environments. The proposed Bayesian game is used to decide strategic equilibrium solutions for selecting modules in the product family being designed. To demonstrate implementation of the proposed Bayesian game, we use a case study involving a family of power tools.
Introduction
For mass customization, companies are increasing their efforts to reduce cost and lead-time for developing new products and services while satisfying individual customer needs. Mass customization depends on a company's ability to provide customized products or services based on economical and flexible development and production systems (Silveria et al., 2001) . By sharing and reusing assets such as components, processes, information, and knowledge across a family of products and services, companies can efficiently develop a set of differentiated economic offerings by improving flexibility and responsiveness of product and service development (Simpson, 2004) . Product family design is a way to achieve cost-effective mass customization by allowing highly differentiated products to be developed from a common platform while targeting products to distinct market segments (Shooter et al., 2004) .
In global sourcing and manufacturing environments, product development will be highly dependent on knowledge-intensive and collaborative systems for building on specialized knowledge across nations, organizations, and professions to develop customized products for different market segments (Szykman et al., 2001 , Lefebvre et al., 2006 . Knowledge-intensive and collaborative support has been increasingly important in product development to maintain future competitive advantage (Zha & Sriram, 2006) . In dynamic and uncertain market environments, however, we only have incomplete or uncertain information regarding market trends, customer's preferences, production costs, and a company's strategies for product development. To facilitate customized product design, we investigate strategic module sharing between products for designing a platform in a product family through a game theoretic approach in an uncertain market environment. Game theoretic approaches provide a proper framework for managing and evaluating strategies to achieve players' goals using their complete or incomplete information and knowledge (Gibbons, 1992) .
The objective of this paper is to propose a methodology for strategic platform design in a product family using concepts from game theory to model the situations of uncertain market environments. We identify module-based platform design by introducing unique modules, common modules, and engineering parameter (EP) modules for product family design. In this paper, we consider a module selection problem as a strategic game with incomplete information that is described by products' market share ratios and customer's preferences. A Bayesian game is employed to model uncertainty situations regarding market environments and decide strategic equilibrium solutions for selecting modules in the product family being designed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and background for product and service family design as well as game theory. Section 3 describes the proposed game theoretical approach for determining EP modules to design a platform using a Bayesian game. Section 4 gives a case study using a family of power tools. Closing remarks and future work are presented in Section 5.
Background and Literature Review

Review of Product Family Design and Game Applications
A product family is a group of related products based on a product platform, facilitating mass customization by providing a variety of products for different market segments cost-effectively (Simpson et al., 2005) . A successful product family depends on how well the trade-offs between the economic benefits and performance losses incurred from having a platform are managed. Simpson et al. (2001) introduced a method to optimize a platform by minimizing performance loss and maximizing commonality. Gonzalez-Zugasti et al. (2000) designed platform modules to minimize design risk and save costs relating to developing a product family. Moore et al. (1999) used conjoint analysis to help determine a product platform. Siddique & Rosen (2000) described a method to design a platform from an existing group of products by comparing commonalities in assembly processes. Rai & Allada (2003) used a two-step approach to determine a modular platform for a product family, which consists of an agent-based optimal technique and postoptimization analysis using the quality loss function. Moon et al. (2006) developed a multi-agent system to identify and configure a module-based platform for a product family using a marketbased reputation mechanism that implements a learning algorithm to select stable and reputable modules in an electronic market environment.
A game is a description of strategic interaction that includes constrains based on players' actions. Game theory provides reasonable solutions for various games and evaluates their properties (Gibbons, 1992 , Osborne & Rubinstein, 2002 . According to constraints and the situations of games, game theoretic models can be partitioned into three categories: (1) cooperative and non-cooperative games, (2) strategic and extensive games, and (3) games with complete and incomplete information. In engineering design, game theoretic approaches have been applied to model strategic relationships between designers for sharing design knowledge and solving design problems. Xiao et al. (2002) applied game theoretic approaches and design capability indices to model the relationships between engineering teams that were described as cooperative, non-cooperative, and leader/follower protocols, and facilitate collaborative decision making during a product realization process. Fernandez et al. (2005) proposed a framework for establishing and managing collaborative design spaces by combining elements of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior, and formulating strategic and extensive games with utility theory. Kopin & Wilbur (2005) introduced a Bayesian game to model cost sharing in uncertain and incomplete information that were related to producer and consumer attributes such as nature, production costs, players and information, and preferences. Correia (2005) investigated the representation of incomplete and asymmetric information to model a strategic Bayesian game that was represented by the constraints of a transmission system and player's strategic reactions to estimate uncertainties. Lewis & Mistree (1998) presented mathematical constructs for modeling a multidisciplinary optimization problem using game theoretic principles and the compromised Decision Support Problem (DSP) in a collaborative, sequential, and isolated design environment.
A Bayesian Game with Incomplete Information
A Bayesian game is designed to model situations wherein some of players have incomplete information or uncertain characteristics for the other players (Osborne & Rubinstein, 2002 , Gibbons, 1992 . The players' uncertainty about each other is described as a set of possible types (or type spaces). In this paper, the normal-form representation of a static Bayesian game is defined as follows (Gibbons, 1992 
For an equilibrium concept for static Bayesian games, the players' strategy spaces in such a game are defined by (Gibbons, 1992) : In a Bayesian game, each player's strategy must be a best response to the other players' strategies. Therefore, given the definition of a strategy in a Bayesian game, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is defined formally as (Gibbons, 1992) : 
That is, no player wants to change his or her strategy, even if the change involves only one action by one type.
In the next section, module-based platform design and the proposed Bayesian game for product family design are discussed in detail.
Strategic Platform Design based on Game Theory for Product Family Design
Module-based Platform Design and Engineering Parameter (EP) Cost Module
The basic idea of modular design is to organize products as a set of distinct components that can be designed independently and develop a variety of products through the combination and standardization of components (Kamrani & Salhieh, 2000) . Modules are achieved by decomposing product functions into functionally independent sub-functions in which interaction or interdependence between sub-functions is minimized (Tarasewich & Nair, 2001 ). The modules make it easier to reuse in different products, allowing development and manufacturing costs to be significantly reduced (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000) .
Modules can be categorized based on function into: (1) unique, (2) common, and (3) variant or engineering parameter (EP) modules. Unique modules are based on distinctive functions within a product family so that components in the modules cannot be replaced by those in different modules to fulfill their tasks. Different functions within the product family can be designed as unique modules to create a variety of products. For example, in a power tool family, a drill module or a blade module is considered as a unique module for a functional option.
Common modules are based on common functions within a product family so that components in the modules can be shared. For instance, a battery module can be designed as a common module to share with all power tools. Variant or EP modules are based on common functions but differ in having different EP values. An EP module is a combination of one or several components that vary between products based on its EP values. The EP of a component is a representative engineering parameter that is accepted for component selection in the market, and each EP component can be provided by a number of suppliers (for example, a motor in an EP module is represented by several EP values (e.g., torque, speed)). If EP values that are selected for a platform do not meet the EP values of corresponding EP modules across a product family, additional EP components (i.e., gears with high ratios) are required to improve the EP values in terms of their functional requirements. As such, EP costs include the costs caused by changing EP components to increase the functionality of common EP modules. We can represent this relationship in a matrix form as shown in the ); hence, the EP costs for EP module i in product k can be formulated at the module level as follows: 
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A well-defined platform reduces production costs by improving economies of scale and reducing the number of different components that are used. Suppose that a product family consists of unique modules, common modules, and EP modules as illustrated in Figure 1 . The platform level is defined as the number of modules in the platform and consists of the common modules and the EP modules. An appropriate platform level for a product family is determined by minimizing the EP costs associated with the EP modules. High levels of the platform (i.e., high commonality of the EP modules) decrease assembly and component costs while increasing EP loss costs. On the contrary, low platform levels (i.e., low commonality of EP modules) decrease EP loss costs while increasing assembly and component costs. The next section discusses the expected strategy cost for designing a platform. 
Expected Strategy Cost
A platform designer determines a feasible set of strategies for the platform based on his/her design knowledge. The strategies are represented as alternative design methods for a platform and can be constructed by combining EP modules in a product family. Let S be a set of strategies, EP a set of EP values, L a set of products in a product family, and Q a set of module quantities. S, EP, L, and Q are finite sets. the expected cost can be determined by component cost and assembly cost and given as:
where l is the number of products, and η is a factor for overhead cost. On the other hand,
is estimated by an expected common cost function:
. Hence, the real
represents the cost of strategy paying ep at quantity q for performing strategy i s for a platform from l products. For example, if components are designed as common modules, the expected common cost for s can be determined based on EP costs as:
where l is a strategy weighting function as follows:
and q is a quantity function as follows:
where χ is a volume discount factor or market share ratio. For a given set of products,
has a constant value, but the value of ) ( i F c varies depending on choosing a strategy for platform design.
Bayesian Game Model for Strategic Platform Design
A module selection problem can be considered as a strategic game with incomplete information. The strategic game provides a useful technique for determining a strategy in uncertain environments (Gibbons, 1992 , Koessler, 2004 . In this paper, we employ a Bayesian game to solve the module selection problem in given product family design.
Consider the following module selection problem for platform design in a dynamic and uncertain market environment. There are two players, a designer who has module strategies for a product family and a customer who has prices for a module. The designer provides a module with the cost c and the customer pays the price v for the module. The designer's cost and the customer's price are dependent on the market share ratio of the product's and customer's preference, respectively. The market share ratio and the customer's preference are independently and uniformly distributed on their market information. The cost and the price are constrained to be non-negative. If the market share ratio is grater than or equal to the customer's preference, then the module will be produced at a price equal to the average of the module's cost and the customer's price; otherwise the module will be not produced. Let us assume that the players are risk-neutral. Each player knows his or her own payoff function but may be uncertain about the other player's payoff functions.
In order to formulate the module selection problem as a Bayesian game, we must identify the action spaces, the type spaces, the beliefs, and the payoff functions (Gibbons, 1992) . In this paper, Player 1 is a designer who knows module design methods for a platform. 
In this game, strategies for Player 1 represent the various market share ratio for module design methods depending on EP modules in a product family. Therefore, engineering parameters' values for platform design can be determined by selecting strategies in uncertain market environments. In the next section, the proposed Bayesian game is applied to determine an EP module for platform design using a case study involving a family of power tools.
Case Study
To demonstrate implementation of the proposed Bayesian game, a power tool family consisting of a jigsaw, circular saw, sander, drill, and brad nailer (see Figure 2 ) is investigated.
The reason for selecting this particular power tool family is availability of data in Design Repository at University of Missouri-Rolla (UMR)
1 . Currently, these products have common modules related only to the electrical components (i.e., the battery) at the platform level. 
Determine Strategy for Platform Design
Using the information from the Design Repository that consists of the bill of materials, assembly relationship, functional flows, and energy flows for the products, we can develop function structure models for each product. Then based on the functional structure models, modules for the products are defined by the heuristic method of Stone et al. (2000) . Table 2 shows modules for the tool family and their target engineering parameters in EP modules. There are 16 modules for developing the new product family: one common module, two EP modules, and 13 unique modules. In the case study, we assume that the engineering parameters of the products are defined as the torque of a motor and the current of a battery. Based on the information in the Design Repository, we can define components for designing EP modules as shown in Table 3 . For example, a motor module consists of three components: a motor, a gear, and a shaft. As shown in Table 3 , a designer can obtain information to fulfill module design from a market by an auction. The information includes size, weight, type, cost, and quantity. We generate the numerical data based on unit cost that is depended on components' EP values. Suppose that Table 3 illustrates the result of bidding with suppliers in a market environment. Common and unique module design can be determined by an auction based on market mechanisms to minimize total production cost. Since the motor module and the battery module are EP modules, we suppose that they are involved in designing the platform. Therefore, appropriate EP values for EP modules can be determined by a game to design the platform. The designer can configure design strategies based on the EP modules for the game with a customer. Table 4 shows possible design strategies of the motor module and the battery module for a platform. For example, from Table 4 , a strategy for the motor module consists of three components: motor A, gear A, and shaft A. The torque of the strategy is 7.5 N.m. (torque 3 N.m × gear ratio 2.5), which satisfies the target engineering parameter for the sander. The EP costs can be calculated by the EP cost model given by Equation (1). We assume that the loss cost of EP is defined as additional component cost, which is 1 and 2 for a torque and a current, respectively. To determine the expected strategy cost, we use the expected cost functions, Equation (2) and (3). The strategies also should satisfy the constraints when the strategies are selected. We assumed that a factor of overhead cost is 2. For the expected unique cost, the designer calculates the excepted strategy cost based on the minimum cost of each design method for each product. and is 34, which was calculated by Equation (2). As shown in Table 5 , the average expected strategy cost of 1 m s for five products is 38.8 and will be used to determine a market price. We can obtain the expected unique cost of the batter module using the same process. The expected strategy cost for common modules are obtained by Equation (3) based on the market share ratio. 
Analysis for a Bayesian Game in Platform Design
The game between a designer and a customer for platform design of this family is defined as the proposed Bayesian game that is described in Section 3.3. Table 6 shows the Bayesian game for determining EP modules with two players. 
where, c is the expected strategy cost and is calculated by:
where, i is the member of design strategies including EP modules, i=2, 3, 4, 5. v is the market price and is obtained by:
And, the probability of 
Close Remarks and Future Work
In this paper, we have investigated strategic module sharing between products for designing a platform in a product family through a game theoretic approach in an uncertain market environment. Module-based design was introduced to explain trade-off in platform level determination for product family design using unique modules, common modules, and engineering parameter (EP) modules. We considered a module selection problem as a strategic game with incomplete information that was represented by products' market share ratio and customer's preference. A Bayesian game was employed to model uncertainty situations regarding market environments and decided strategic equilibrium solutions for selecting module design strategy based on the expected strategy cost in product family design. We have applied the proposed Bayesian game to determine platform design strategies using a case study involving a family of power tools.
Through the case study, we demonstrated that the Bayesian game can be used to determine the EP-value of an EP module that was described as a design strategy for platform design.
Therefore, we expect that the Bayesian game can help to facilitate product family design in dynamic and uncertain market environments. To improve the Bayesian game, we need to develop a method that can identify modules based on the designers' knowledge and customers' requirements for establishing design strategies effectively. Since an expected strategy cost function is sensitive to parameters in the mathematical model, the parameters should be determined based on products' characteristics, company's and customers' preferences, and a market environment. For a large-scale product family, an effective search algorithm is needed to generate a set of feasible strategy in a game. To explore the best response of players in Bayesian games, we should consider computationally intensive numerical integration such as Markovchain or Monte-Carlo simulation methods for the market share ratios and customer's preferences.
Future research efforts will be focused on improving the efficiency of the Bayesian game, developing design strategies for various product family environments, and expanding its application to developing a negotiation mechanism for web-based product family design.
